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CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION
IN WISCONSIN-PART I*
By GoRDoN B. BALDWIN**
More than ten years ago work was commenced under the leadership
of the Legislative Council looking toward the creation of a Criminal
Code. One of the first topics of the project was the law relating to
crimes against property. Crimes involving acts directed against property
were divided into three types, crimes involving damage to property,
trespass upon property and misappropriation of property. It is the pur-
pose of this monograph to survey in the light of the drafting history
the criminal law dealing with misappropriations as it has been estab-
lished in the Criminal Code.
It would have been very easy for the draftsmen to have simplified
the statutory provisions dealing with misappropriation by borrowing a
definition from the Roman law, ".. . the fraudulent handling of an-
other man's thing, without his agreement, and with the intention of
stealing it.... ." For a number of reasons this solution was not adopted.
The types of misappropriation that society experiences involve varying
degrees of risk to life or property or both and consequently legislators
require some variation in the penalty that should be imposed. The dis-
cretion exercised by prosecutors and courts is guided by requiring them
to act within certain legislatively imposed limits. A broad definition
might also run afoul of the so-called void-for-vagueness doctrine. A
more potent reason for rejecting any blanket definition, however, is
that the common law has supplied useful categories of cririinal conduct
and statutory reform is easier of accomplishment if these categories are
retained.
A. Theft in General.
Section 943.20 brings into a single statute the contents of some
twenty-three statutes which once plagued the law against misappropri-
ation in Wisconsin. It embodies crimes heretofore known as larceny,
larceny by bailee, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses
*This is the first of two parts of this article. The second part will appear in the
next issue of the Marquette Law Review.
**Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School,
A.B. 1950 Haverford College, LL.B. 1953 The Cornell Law School.1 Kenny's OUTUNES or CRImiNAL LAW, 17th ed. by Turner, 238 (1958).
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and confidence game and calls them "theft."2 Other crimes involving
misappropriation are dealt with in succeeding sections of Chapter 943.
Pleading "theft" requires merely a charge ". . . that the defendant did
steal the property (describing it) of the owner (naming him) of the
value of (stating the value in money). . . ."3 The amalgamation accom-
plished by Section 943.20 eliminates a problem inherent in the prior
law. Prior to the Criminal Code a conviction of larceny would not have
been sustained on appeal by showing that there was only evidence upon
which the jury could properly have convicted of, for example, false
pretenses. Under the Criminal Code the jury can bring in a verdict of
"theft" which will be sustained if the requisites of any one of the sub-
sections in 943.20 (1) are fulfilled.
Prior law remains pertinent in that the various ways in which theft
can be committed as set forth in 943.20(1) correspond generally to the
old crimes. The proof offered to convict an accused must conform to
one of the four subsections of 943.20(1) and the jury must be instructed
pursuant to these subsections. Some insight into the meaning of particu-
lar words may be gained from a study of the common law.
B. Theft at Common Law.4
At common law the crime of larceny required a trespassory taking
out of the possession of the owner. In the absence of legislation it was
left to the courts to define precisely the scope of the crime. This they
did by adjusting the concept of possession. Through judicial construc-
tion they achieved desired ends of making the crime broader or less
sweeping within the same verbal framework. For example, a servant
with physical possession of property was held to have only custody;
2 943.20 covers wholly or partially what was included in the following 1953
statutes:
343.14 Larceny; stealing lead pipe 343.32 Sale of land without title
343.15 Larceny from persons or 343.341 Manufacture and distribution
corpses of cheating tokens
343.16 Looting 343.35 False pretense as to heirship
343.17 Larceny; property; values; 343.37 Corporation officers; frauds
bailee; gas by
343.172 Larcney of property in nature 343.405 Fraud on life insurance corn-
of realty pany
343.173 Stealing birds, dogs or beasts 343.41 False statements
343.174 Larceny of domestic animals 343.45 Injury to public property
343.175 Fraudulent use of gas, elec- 343.50 Booming or manufacturing
tricity, water, steam marked log
343.20 Embezzlement 343.51 Larceny of logs; evidence;
343.24 False pretenses, personating damages; right of search
another 343.571 Warehouse receipts, frauds
343.253 Mendicant imposters respecting
343.31 Gross fraud 348.402 Confidence games3 
WIS. STAT. §955.31 (1959).
4 See Melli and Remington, Theft-A Comparative Analysis of the Present Law
and the Proposed Criminal Code, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 253, for a valuable study
by two of the Criminal Code's draftsmen. The Melli-Remington study sup-
plied the initial impetus for this article which also drew upon the hundreds of
memoranda and minutes given only limited circulation. These documents are
preserved at the University of Wisconsin Law School.
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the courts said that "constructive possession" remained with the master.5
The servant who misappropriated the property of his master was there-
fore guilty of larceny, a capital offense at early common law. Similarly
a bailee who violated the terms of the bailment was held to have only
custody after the violation, and the subsequent misappropriation re-
sulted in a taking out of the possession of the owner. Hence larceny
by a bailee was accomplished." The law of larceny thus brought certain
misappropriations by bailees and servants within its purview. Close dis-
tinctions between "possession" and "custody" made the criminal law
highly technical and difficult to administer.
The definition of larceny was narrowed in other respects by the
courts to involve only those situations where there was some violent and
unmistakable form of a change of possession, usually in the form of a
trespass. Possibly the desire to restrict the scope of offenses requiring
the death penalty encouraged less sweeping constructions of the concept
of possession, except in the cases of bailees and servants.
Judicial expansion upon the definition of larceny did not fill all the
needs presented by newly arising problems and changing attitudes as to
what constituted improper behavior with regard to property. Two im-
portant areas were left untouched by common law larceny: (1) the
appropriation of property by a person (not a servant or bailee) who
had lawful possession at the time of the appropriation, and (2) the
acquisition of property by fraudulent means. The crime of embezzle-
ment was created by legislation to provide for the first situation. The
crimes of obtaining by false pretenses and confidence game covered the
latter. Although there were difficulties in distinguishing among these,
the boundaries between the various forms of theft were at least verbally
certain. Larceny was theft by a trespassory taking of property out of
the possession of another. Embezzlement was a theft by the appropria-
tion of property lawfully in the possession of certain specified persons
at the time of the appropriation. False pretenses was theft by fraudulent
inducement of another to part with possession of property. Confidence
game, a more recent statutory crime, was designed to fill gaps left by
the crime of false pretenses, and in Wisconsin required the use of a
visible material, token or symbol.7
5 State v. Schingen, 20 Wis. 79 (1865). If, however, the servant received the
property in order to deliver it to the master, the servant was held to have
"possession," and his misappropriation did not constitute larceny.6 Accord, State v. Burke, 189 Wis. 641, 207 N.W. 406 (1926) where the crime
of larceny by bailee was committed by an attorney who converted funds to
his own use obtained by false representation, inducing his client to furnish
money with which to purchase stock for the client. Because the attorney did
not acquire legal title, the misappropriation constituted larceny rather than
false pretenses.
The doctrine that the bailee who violated the terms of the bailment could
be treated as one who committed larceny can be traced to The Carrier's Case
in 1473, see Hall, THErr, LAW AND SocrErY, Ch. I (2nd ed. 1952).
7 State ex rel Labuwi v. Hathaway, 168 Wis. 518, 170 N.W. 654 (1919).
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Wisconsin statutes dealing with misappropriation prior to the Crim-
inal Code embodied this common law structure. As new problems arose,
piecemeal legislation was passed to meet specified problems. The number
of statutes increased to the point that boundaries between the three
major forms of theft, once verbally clear, became confused. Construc-
tion of the many statutes led to overlaps and inconsistencies making
their administration more difficult and the law more uncertain and less




943.20(1) a penalizes as a thief, one who:
Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, transfers, con-
ceals, or retains possession of movable property of another
without his consent and with intent to deprive the owner
permanently of possession of such property.
In construing 942.20(1) a an unintentional ambiguity on the face of the
statute should be resolved to determine specifically what the prosecution
must prove. Does the statute require proof that a) the defendant did
"take" possession of certain property AND b) do something further?
Or, need the prosecution merely show that the defendant either "took
and carried away," or "used," or "transferred," or "concealed," or
"retained possession of," property? This ambiguity was not intended.9
s Only Louisiana has combined larceny, embezzlement and obtaining by false
pretenses, into a single statute redefining unapproved behavior in relation to
property. LA. STAT. 14.67 (1950). A number of states have combined the
crimes within a single section thus reducing pleading difficulties, see N.Y.
PENAL LAW 1290 (1944); see Stumberg, Criminal Appropriation of Movables
-A Need for Reform, 19 TEx L. REv. 117, 300 (1941). The Model Penal
Code, Tentative Draft #2 contains a valuable analysis of the legislative prob-
lems.
The Wisconsin Proposed Code of 1953 suggested a single section defining
the crime of "stealing" as follows:
343.20 STEALING. (1) Whoever does any of the following may be penal-
ized as provided in sub. (3) :
(a) With intent to appropriate the property to his own use, intentionally
takes, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of the property of
another without his consent; or
(b) With intent to appropriate the property to his own use, intentionally
obtains the property of another by misleading him with a false representation
of past or existing fact or with a promise made with an intent not to perform
it; or
(c) Having an interest in the property, takes, uses, transfers, conceals, or
retains possession of that property with intent to defeat the interest of another
therein; or
(d) With intent not to pay for them, obtains the services of a public utility.
9 The 1950 recommendation of the Code's draftsmen would have established a
single offense of "stealing" by punishing:
[Whomever] "intentionally appropriates the property of another without
his consent by means of deceit. .. ."
The significant point in this provision is the meaning of the word "appropri-
ates." It was defined as an "exercise of dominion over property in a manner
inconsistent with the rights of the owner, either by taking, obtaining, using,
transferring, concealing, or retaining possession of his property." This propo-
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On the contrary, the draftsmen intended to describe precisely prohibited
behavior with respect to property.
The Model Penal Code in its tentative draft dealing with theft takes
the position that the behavior sought to be proscribed can best be de-
scribed as a ". .. taking or exercise of unauthorized control. . . ."10 The
kinds of behavior-circumstances enumerated in 943.20(1)a are ex-
amples of a taking or assumption of unlawful control, and such legisla-
tive history as is available leads to the conclusion that the codification
that the Criminal Code accomplished was intended to embody the
reformation of the law of larceny to avoid the extreme technicalities of
the common law.1' Consequently it seems sound to conclude that the
sal made no longer determinative the question of who had possession of the
property. Under the 1950 recommendation a person lawfully in possession of
another's property may intentionally exercise dominion over it in a manner
inconsistent with the rights of the owner just as much as one who takes the
property out of the owner's possession. The "take" notion was not a vital
part of the appropriation, but was merely one way of appropriating.
The 1953 Proposed Code punished for the crime of "stealing" persons who
committed one of several kinds of misappropriation, including:
"[Whoever] with intent to appropriate the property to his own use, in-
tentionally takes, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of the
property of another without his consent.....
The words "appropriate the property to his own use" were defined as an "ex-
ercise of dominion over the property in a manner inconsistent with the rights
of the owner." To come within the purview of the Proposed Code the defend-
ant must "take, use, transfer, conceal or retain possession" of the property.
Under the 1953 Proposed Code as under the 1950 Recommendation it made
no difference whether the misappropriated property were in the possession or
custody of the actor or in the possession or custody of another. (See Bill No.
100 A p. 112, Vol. 5, 1953 Wisconsin Legislative Council Report). As in the
1950 Recommendation the act essential for the crime could be accomplished
in several ways, only one of which required a taking. The 1950 and 1953 pro-
posals thus proscribed certain behavior in terms somewhat different than the
common law.
The Criminal Code Advisory Committee revised the 1953 Proposed Code's
theft provisions apparently with a view to reviving some of the old common
law language such as "takes and carries away." (See minutes of May 7, 1955
p. 12-13).
'I The Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #4, Sec. 206.1 states that: "A person
commits theft if he takes or exercises unauthorized control over movable
property of another. . .." A comment to this section states:
"This description of the behavior that constitutes theft of the larceny-
embezzlement type replaces the common law larceny requirements of
'caption' and 'asportation,' as well as a great variety of current legis-
lative terms such as steal, take, remove, carry away, receive, secrete,
conceal, withhold, retain, fail or refuse to pay, appropriate, convert, em-
bezzle, misappropriate, convert embezzle, misapply, sell, convey, trans-
fer, dispose, pledge, use. Most of these are only examples of the exer-
cise of unlawful control." (Comment 3, Tentative Draft #2).
The language adopted in 943.20 is archaic in that the interest in property
deemed worthy of contemporary protection is best described in terms of ex-
cluding others from exercising certain authority over the property of others.
Possession, a troublesome concept in common law larceny, was both narrowly
and broadly construed according to the impact that it was desired the law of
larceny to have. See Kenny, OUTLINES OF CRImiNAL LAW, 17th ed. by Turner
238-239.
11953 Report, Wisconsin Legislative Council, Vol V p. ii; see also Platz, The
Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Rav. 350, 374. This excellent oft-cited article
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statute describes the kind of behavior that might more accurately be
described as a ". . . taking or exercise of unauthorized control. . ....
Hence the latter alternative interpretation of the ambiguity is preferred.
In delineating the behavior made criminal in 943.20(1)a unusual
difficulties will be encountered if the words are construed mechanically
without regard for the interests protected. An example suggested by the
Model Penal Code illustrates this. At what point is a theft committed
when a man contemplating the theft of an automobile commences the
actions intended to accomplish his purpose? When he opens the unlocked
car door? When he sits in the driver's seat? When he either picks the
lock or crosses the ignition wires? When he starts the engine? When
he shifts into gear? When he puts the car into motion? At the last stage
the thief has clearly come within the purview of 943.20(1)a, for he has
begun to carry the property away, but critical wrongful acts have already
occurred to which the law may wish to attach the consequences of a
completed crime. By sitting in the driver's seat the actor may have taken
possession or he may be now using the car. The comment to the Model
Penal Code suggests that:
.*. the critical psychological 'threshold' for a would-be auto thief
is probably the point at which he enters the car and addresses
himself to the controls, rather than the moment when he releases
the clutch or steps on the gas to put the car in motion. Before
he 'takes the wheel' he will be more easily frightened off or he
may voluntarily desist .... 12
If the actions detailed in 943.20(1) a are construed to describe behavior
resulting in an "unauthorized control" the crime is committed when the
actor takes possession and control by "taking the wheel." If it is not
theft at this point, then it is conduct which may be deemed attempted
theft.'
3
Punishment of the person who misappropriates property lawfully
within his possession will be made more difficult unless the behavior-
circumstances detailed in 943.20(1)a are considered as alternatives.
Other jurisdictions supply illustrations of the difficulties of a different
approach. Conforming to the common law requirement that some sort
of trespass be disclosed some courts have refused to find criminal an
intentional and wrongful misappropriation of property. The Uniform
Code of Military Justice punishes any person "who wrongfully takes,
obtains, or withholds [property] by any means whatever from the pos-
session of the true owner or of any other person."14 A court martial
found that the accused, in consideration of $5, pawned a watch for a
by one of the code's draftsmen states with respect to 943.20, ". . . most of the
difficulties which have been encountered in the past are eliminated."
12 Tentative Draft #2, Sec. 206.1 Comment 3.
13 Wis. STAT. §939.32 (1959).
'4 Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 921.
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friend who had stolen it. The conviction was reversed on appeal on
the ground that the statute, stating the common law, required that there
be a "taking by trespass" from the possession of the owner. The theory
of a wrongful withholding of the watch, without presence of an ele-
ment of taking by trespass was held insufficient to sustain a conviction.'
This result was reached in spite of the assumption that the actor in-
tended to misappropriate and in fact had acted so as to reduce the true
owner's chance of regaining the property.
Although courts dealing with theft cases often emphasize the tres-
pass notion, larceny by trick cases reveal that trespass was not an es-
sential element, even under Wisconsin law prior to, the Criminal Code
if the actor were a bailee."" In Vought v. State17 the defendants, members
of a town board, decided to profit from their position. They went
through the procedure of allowing claims and making out orders for the
payment of money to fictitious people. Some of these fraudulent claims
were presented for payment by the defendants. On appeal from a con-
viction for larceny one of the town board members claimed he was not
guilty of larceny because he had lawful possession of the property
misappropriated; 'if he was guilty of anything, he claimed, it was em-
bezzlement. The conviction for larceny was sustained by the court
which said:
.. the property of the town was in possession of its officers for
lawful, not for unlawful, purposes, and every unlawful diversion
of funds of the town by its officers involves the element of non-
consent on the part of the town. Nor is it necessary that a trespass
in the technical sense be committed in order to constitute larceny,
where the property is taken by artifice, fraud or false pretenses.
This interpretation of the larceny by bailee provision in the pre-Criminal
Code law blurred the distinction between larceny and embezzlement to
an even greater extent. If the interpretation is accepted, the merger of
larceny and embezzlement into a single section was accomplished prior
to te Criminal Code.
The Code does not offer much assistance in defining the meaning of
various words used to describe the requisite behavior for theft. "Trans-
fer" is defined as ". . . any transaction involving a change in possession
of any property, or a change of right, title, or interest to or in any
1' United States v. Kopp, 15 C.M.R. 815 (1954), cf. United States v. Buck, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 341, 12 C.%.R. 97 (1953).
16 Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373, 128 N.W. 987 (1911) ; see also Bergeron v. Pey-
ton, 106 Wis. 377, 380, 82 N.W. 291 (1900).
17 135 Wis. 6, 15, 114 N.W. 518 (1908). The distinction between conversion by a
bailee of an entire thing (not common law larceny) and the unlawful break-
ing of bulk with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession (lar-
ceny since The Carrier's Case) was abolished by statute in 1887, Laws of




property."'" For the meaning of other terms one must refer to case law
and the construction of similar statutory language. In referring to the
common law, caution must be exercised because theft is now more
leniently treated and common law distinctions and constructions de-
signed to mitigate the hardship of a strict application of concepts may
lose their persuasiveness in a modern setting.
The common law constituted the basis of the English Larceny Act
of 1916 wherein one commits larceny who "takes and carries away" the
property of another, etc. 19 The definition of "takes" includes in this
statute obtaining possession:
(a) by any trick;
(b) by intimidation;
(c) under a mistake on the part of the owner with knowledge on
the part of the taker that possession has been so obtained;
(d) by finding, where at the time of the finding the finder be-
lieves that the owner can be discovered by taking reasonable
steps....
This inclusive definition might properly obtain in Wisconsin. It is com-
patible with pre-Criminal Code cases in Wisconsin dealing with larceny
by trick.20 Larceny by trick grew out of the rule that fraud vitiates
consent, and that a person obtaining possession by fraud does not have
possession with the consent of the owner. Confusion surrounded the
application of this principle because of the overlap between a larceny
by a bailee and an embezzlement involving a trick. A distinction was
made in the cases between obtaining possession only and obtaining title
as well as possession. Illustrative of the latter distinction is Brockman
v. State,21 where a conviction for larceny was reversed. The defendant
inserted in a Milwaukee paper an ad stating: "Elderly man or woman
may find a good permanent home if desired, with respectable woman
and daughter in return for a safe loan on property and interest for $300.
Must have money in a short time." Relying upon this ad the complain-
ant paid the money but received no lodging in return. The court held
that the complainant had not intended to retain any ownership in the
money but had given the defendant the money for her own use entirely.
Because the defendant had obtained title as well as possession of the
money, she could not be guilty of larceny. The question of whether the
defendant's conduct constituted false pretenses was not before the court.
The Brockman case remains today as an illustration of a situation where
proof of theft might be sought under 943.20(1)d but not under
Is Wis. STAT. §939.22 (40) (1959).
9 6 and 7 Geo. 5, c. 50; Halsbury's Statutes of England 2nd ed., Vol. 5. The
purpose of the act was to "consolidate and simplify" the law relating to lar-
ceny. It may be taken as embodying the common law definition of larceny.
Stephen's, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, 8th ed. by Sturge (1947) 320.
20 State v. Burke, supra note 6.
21 192 Wis. 15, 211 N.W. 936 (1927).
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943.20(1)a. The import of decision was that there was no taking of pos-
session, nor was there any use, concealment, or retention of the property
of another.
In summary, the requisite act which must be proven to sustain a
conviction under 943.20 (1) a is either a taking and carrying away, a use,
a transfer, a concealment, or a retention. If the other requisites are
present a theft may be established.
2. The object of theft under 943.20(1)a.
The object of the theft specified in 943.20(1)a is "movable prop-
erty," defined as:
Property whose physical location can be changed, without limita-
tion including electricity and gas, documents which represent or
embody tangible rights, and things growing on, affixed to or
found in land.
22
In the old statutes numerous sections were enacted to enlarge the subject
matter of larceny, because the common law limited it to personalty.
Deeds to land, choses in action, things affixed to the land, once outside
the scope of common law larceny, were brought within by specific
statutes. Because property in the Criminal Code was broadly defined
many sections could be eliminated.
23
The mere fact that the object of the theft is a contraband article has
no bearing on whether a theft can or cannot be committed, so long as the
22 Wis. STAT. §943.20(2)b (1959) "Property" is in turn defined in 943.20(2)a
infra. The definitions are similar to those adopted by the Model Penal Code.
See 206.64, Tentative Draft #2.
23 The following sections were repealed:
343.14 Larceny; stealing lead pipe; penalty, specified that lead pipe from a
partially constructed building may not be stolen.
343.15 Larceny; from persons or corpses, and 343.16 Looting, were like the
section discussed above in that they dealt with larceny in particular circum-
stances. Because they covered circumstances which made stealing particularly
dangerous or undesirable, the penalty in the new section is increased in sub-
section (3)d under the same circumstances. (943.20(3)d).
343.17 Larceny; property; values; bailee; gas, contained a long list includ-
ing certain choses in action and gas, water, steam, or electricity.
343.172 Larceny of property in nature of realty, made property in the na-
ture of realty a subject of larceny, thus abrogating the common-law rule in
that respect.
343.173 Stealing birds, dogs or beasts, including certain animals not the
subject of larceny at common law.
Fraudulent use of gas, electricity, water and steam, was principally a speci-
fic attempt section, prohibiting the doing of certain things to gas, water, steam,
and electricity meters and equipment with intent to defraud. Gas, water,
steam and electricity are all property and anyone obtaining them by hooking
up unauthorized pipes or rigging the meter so it does not register is guilty of
taking the property of another without his consent. See also §§98.25 (2),
98.26.
343.45 Injury to public property, made it a crime, among other things, to
steal timber, minerals, earth and stone from state lands.
343.50 Booming or manufacturing market log, prohibited specific conduct
in relation to logs which amounted to stealing them.
343.51 Larceny of logs; evidence; damages; right of search. Subsection
(1) covered the larceny of logs. See 30.083 Conversion of logs.
1960-61]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
object comes within the broad definition of property in 943.20(2) .24
Wisconsin specifically indicates that matter such as electricity and gas
may be the subject of theft thus avoiding a gap in the law found by
decisions in some other jurisdictions. 5 At common law real property was
not the subject of larceny nor were the fixtures such as buildings, fences,
or machinery attached to the land, unless the real property had acquired
the character of personal property through some act of a person other
than the thief. Such an artificial distinction is specifically rejected by
the definition in 943.20 (2) a stating:
• . . all forms of tangible property, whether real or personal,
without limitation including electricity and gas and documents
which represent or embody a chose in action or other intangible
rights.
All tangible things are now subjects of theft including negotiable notes, 26
commercial paper, and the like.2 7
The comprehensive definition of property in the Criminal Code does
not, however, reach all persons who intend a misappropriation. It does
not reach the deceiver who takes labor and services from another with-
out any intention of paying. The doctor, architect, engineer and garage-
men may be victimized and deserves protection, but the property defini-
tions are not comprehensive enough to cover these misappropriations
of services and time. If criminal sanctions are needed to protect them
specific statutes must be enacted. 28 A number of statutes outside the
criminal code deal with misappropriation of certain kinds of property
such as timber theft,29 use of false weights or measures,23 theft of tax
moneys, 31 banking funds,32 theft by contractors, 33 theft from a decedent's
estate,34 but the professional man must continue to rely on the inade-
quate civil remedy for their protection.
24 State v. Clementi, 224 Wis. 145, 272 N.W. 29 (1937). See People ex rel Koons
v. Elling, 190 Misc. 998, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 103 (N.Y. Spec. Term Ontario Co.
1948) where the court rejected the defendant's claim that larceny could not
be committed because the money was taken from an unlawful slot machine in
which no person could have any title or possessory rights. cf. People v. Otis,
235 N.Y. 421, 139 N.E. 562 (1923).25 See People v. Ashworth, 220 App. Div. 498, 222 N.Y. Supp. 24 (4th Dept. N.Y.
1927) but contra, People v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N.E. 2d 403 (1937).26 Farrell v. Phillips, 140 Wis. 611, 123 N.W. 117 (1909).
27 See Carver v. Pierce, Style 66, 82 Eng. Rep. 534 (K.B. 1648) for an extensive
discussion of whether dung was a chattel or part of the realty. The law will
no longer be enriched with such issues.
28 For example see 943.21 Fraud on hotel or restaurant keeper; 943.22 Use of
cheating tokens; see Model Penal Code Tentative Draft #4 Sec. 206.7 and
comment in Tentative Draft #2 p. 91. The problem is illustrated by Chap-
pell v. United States, 270 F. 2d 274 (9th Cir. 1959) where the court had to
dismiss a charge that an Air Force Master Sergeant converted to his own use
services and labor of a member of the armed forces.29 WIs. STAT. §26.05 (1959).
30 Wis. STAT. §98.25 (1959).
31 Wis. STAT. §78.15 (1959).
32 WIs. STAT. §221.39 (1959).
33 WIS. STAT. §§289.536, 289.02(4) (1959).
34 WIS. STAT. §§312.05, 312.06(1) (1959).
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3. Property of Another
Theft as described in 943.20 is an offense against the property "of
another." 35 This is defined in 939.22(28) as ". . . property in which a
person other than the actor has a legal interest which the actor has no
right to defeat and impair, even though the actor may have a legal
interest in the property." Consequently when property is abandoned it
is no longer the property "of another." 36 Whether or not property is
abandoned is an involved question of fact.37 "Property of another" is
defined in 943.20(2)d as including ". . . property in which the actor is
a co-owner and property of a partnership of which the actor is a mem-
ber, unless the actor and the victim are husband and wife." 38 Thus it
is not possible for a spouse to be found guilty of the theft of property
in which each has an interest and no third person has a share. One
spouse may, however, steal the property owned solely by the other.
That the property may have been "lost" does not mean that it can
not be misappropriated because the right of the true owner is still de-
serving of protection. The finder of lost property by his finding com-
mits no crime, but where the finder retains the property from the true
owner with the requisite criminal intent, a theft may be present under
943.20(1)a because of the unauthorized retention of control.36 In effect
what is punished is a failure to act accompanied by a mental purpose in-
tentionally to retain possession so as to deprive the owner permanently
of possession. A fortiori one who negligently fails to restore property
is not a thief. To convict for a retention it should be shown that (1)
the actor knows the identity of the owner, or by reasonable efforts could
learn his identity and that (2) the actor purposely omits to take reason-
able measures to restore the property to the owner.
At common law whether the actor committed larceny or not respect-
ing lost property depended on the actor's state of mind at the moment
of finding 40 If he had no criminal intent at the time of finding there
could be no conviction for larceny although he subsequently decided to
appropriate the property to his own use. The rationale for the distinction
was that common law larceny involved an infringement of another's
possession, and if there was no trespass there could be no larceny. It
is virtually impossible to make a realistic appraisal of the actor's state
35 Cf. WIS. STAT. §943. 20(1)c (1959) wherein the accused may have a legal in-
terest in the property, but nonetheless commits theft by a taking from a person
with a superior right of possession.36 Clifton v. State, 52 Wis. 533, 9 N.W. 389 (1881). cf. State v. Taylor, 3 Dutcher
117, 27 N.J. 117, 72 Am. Dec. 347 (1858).37 Pleau v. State, 259 Wis. 105, 47 N.W. 2d 330 (1951).
38 Contra in some jurisdictions where one may steal joint property from ones
spouse-see People v. Morton, 308 N.Y. 96 ,123 N.E. 2d 790 (1954).
39 See Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #4, Sec. 206.5; English Larceny Act
of 1916, supra note 19, finding is a theft if "at the time of the finding the finder
believes that the owner can be discovered by taking reasonable steps."
40Model Penal Code, ibid, Comment #2; Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW 208-209.
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of mind when a piece of property is found and the result in the cases
which have considered this problem seems to depend more on matters
revealed by the actor's subsequent conduct.4 1
The criminal law seeks to protect the owner's interest against an im-
proper retention of control and if the actor after having formed the
requisite criminal purpose, "takes" unauthorized control of or retains
the property, even though he may have acquired it lawfully, a Wiscon-
sin court could properly sustain a conviction under 943.20(1)a and find
support in the old law on the ground that the finder has become a bailee
of the property.4 2 A number of cases evaluated the actor's state of mind
at the time of the finding by examining whether the property gave any
"clue to ownership."4 3 If there were no clue to the ownership the finder
might appropriate it to his use without liability for larceny.
4. Without Consent.
The essence of common law larceny being a trespassory taking, the
element of non-consent was vital. The leading Wisconsin decision for
the proposition that dominion must be exercised without consent is
Topolewski v. State.44 Here the complainant learned of the defendant's
intention to steal certain goods and instructed his employees to cooper-
ate with defendant so that the defendant might be arrested and convicted
of larceny. The plans made by the defendant were carried out, an em-
ployee putting goods on a loading platform and informing co-employees
to permit the defendant to call for the goods and take them. Although
the plan worked perfectly the court held that an element in the crime of
larceny was lacking because the conduct of the complainant amounted
to a consent to the taking. No effort to convict the defendant for an
attempted theft was made in the case and that possibility remains open.
An interesting case for comparison is United States v .Buck,4 5 de-
cided by the United States Court of Military Appeals. The defendant
approached one Hatley, a supply sergeant, and indicated his interest in
securing a quantity of goods from government stocks. Hatley reported
41 Clifton v. State, supra note 36. Here the owner of musical instruments left
them in a box outside the door of a saloon owned by him. Defendants dis-
covered the box and took the box and instruments away. They subsequently
pawned the box and instruments for three dollars. A conviction for larceny
was affirmed. The court stated:
"They made no attempt to find to whom the instruments belonged, and
did not even take the trouble to read the signs of the owners on his
saloon.... Under this evidence, there is no room for the claim that the
box and contents were lost or abandoned property."
42 See Burns v. State, slepra note 16.43 State v. Posey, 88 S.C. 313, 70 S.E. 612 (1911) ; McAllister v. State, 206 Ark.
998, 178 S.W. 2d 67 (1944) ; State v. Dean, 49 Iowa 73 (1878).
44 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906) ; State v. Morey, 2 Wis. 494 (1853) (non-
consent should be proved by the testimony of the owner if possible) ; State v.
Moon, 41 Wis. 684 (1877) ; Baker v. State, 88 Wis. 140, 155, 59 N.W. 570, 575(1894); Fetkenhauer v. State, 112 Wis. 491, 88 N.W. 294 (1901); Vought v.
State, 135 Wis. 6, 114 N.W. 518 (1908).
453 U.S.C.M.A. 341, 12 C.M.R. 97 (1953).
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the defendant's plan to his superior officers as well as to the post legal
officer and it was decided to follow the defendant's request in order to
catch him in the act. Accordingly, the goods were placed at the door of
the building. From here the defendant removed them, and, upon being
apprehended was charged with larceny. His defense was "consent." The
court cited and distinguished Topolewski by pointing out that no person
involved here had any authority to dispose of the government-owned
goods taken by the defendant. Armed service regulations conferred
"neither expressly nor by implication" any authority to deliver the prop-
erty in question. "Whether the officers and Hatley intended to surrender
possession outright, or solely to catch an offender, their actions could
not bind the government.""
5. The Mental Element in 943.20(1)a.
The mental element required for a conviction under 943.20(1)a is
expressed in two phases, (1) the act must be done "intentionally" and
(2), must be done ". . with intent to deprive the owner permanently
of possession. . . ."47 The former is explained in 939.23(3) and would
require here that the defendant know that the property belonged to an-
other and that his actions with respect to the property were without the
consent of the owner. The latter provision is more complex and de-
serves further examination.
The Criminal Code here uses language conforming to the common
law of larceny and many of the anomalies of the common law may
continue to plague the courts. Larceny at common law requires an in-
tent to deprive the owner permanently of possession, and therefore a
claim of right or of intent to return the property was a defense.48 An
intent to return was not, however, a defense to embezzlement, nor is it
now a defense to theft prosecuted under 943.20(1)b. An anomalous
situation could still obtain. A bailee who misappropriated property, but
intended to return it, may have a defense if the prosecution's proof is
made pursuant to 943.20(1) a, but if the property and the defendant are
within the ambit of 943.20(1)b it will not serve as a defense because
the mental element under the latter section is an "intent to convert to
48 Ibid. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 345, 12 C.M.R. 101; Compare Reg v. Egginton, (1801) 2
East, P.C. 666, Stephen's DIGEST, 326.
4 The mental element described in the Criminal Code will be more difficult to
manage than that set forth in the Proposed Code. The Proposed Code stated
that the mental element required for stealing is an "intent to appropriate the
property to his own use." This was further defined as "intent to exercise
dominion over the property in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the
owner." If the property were a chattel the requisite mental element would have
been lacking if the "actor made no further transfer, and at the time, intended
merely to use it, and to return it promptly." (Proposed Code, Sec. 343.20-(2) a). This simplified language was rejected by a majority of the Criminal
Code Advisory Committee.
4s State v. Leicham, 41 Wis. 565, 579-580 (1877) ; see also Lechner v. Ebenreiter,
235 Wis. 244, 292 N.W. 913 (1940); Farrell v. Phillips, supra note 26.
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his own use." An intent to convert to one's own use involves a dominion
less exclusive than an intent to deprive the owner permanently of pos-
session. The person who takes an automobile of another merely for
temporary use is not necessarily guilty of theft by this act. A specific
statute was enacted to cover this misappropriation. 9
The Criminal Code does not deal specially with the person who helps
himself to property offered for sale but who has an intention to pay
promptly. iason v. State,50 an Arkansas decision, supplies an amusing
example of such a situation. The complainant was a purveyor of beer.
The defendants, long time acquaintances, late one Saturday night woke
the complainant out of a sound sleep by calling for beer. Notwithstand-
ing a refusal they entered the building and took a gallon of beer worth
about thirty cents. A conviction for larceny was reversed by the court
on the ground that the State had not fulfilled its burden to prove
"... evidence of a design to deprive [complainant] of his property, or
of an intention to take it without giving him a quid pro quo of equal
value." The Model Penal Code offers a solution to this problem. It
would provide:
Intent to pay for property does not preclude criminal liability for
theft, except that a person who helps himself to property offered
for sale or hire does not commit theft if he intends and is able
to pay promptly.51
To prove the mental element the state need only show the intentional
acts of taking and carrying away, transferring, using, concealing, or
retaining. From this the jury may infer the requisite intent. Courts
sometimes emphasize on appeal instructions that may be given to a jury.
"The law presumes that a person intends the natural and probable con-
sequences of his own acts but the presumption may be rebutted. ' 52 The
real question is simply whether the jury can infer an intention to deprive
permanently from their consideration of all the acts proved by the state.
Proof that the defendant abandoned the taken property may be suf-
ficient to show the requisite intent if the circumstances indicate an in-
difference to the owner's chance of regaining possession. In Schroeder
v. State,53 the defendants took two automobiles which several weeks
later were found abandoned two counties away. The distance was em-
phasized no more specifically. The court sustained a conviction for lar-
ceny under the old law.54 That statute said nothing whatsoever about
49 ",rIS. STAT. §943.23 (1959).
5032 ARM. 238 STAT. (1957).
51 Sec. 206.10, Tentative Draft #2.
52 State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 604, 93 N.W. 2d 354, 359 (1958); State v.
Vinson, 269 Wis. 305, 309, 68 N.W. 2d 712, 70 N.W. 2d 1, 4 (1955) ; Clark and
Marshall, CRImEs, 6th ed. by Wingersky (1958) 730 et seq.
53 222 Wis. 251, 267 N.W. 899 (1936).
,Wis. STAT., §343.17 (1953).
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the mental element and presumably directed the court to the common
law. The court stated:
S.. there were clearly issues for the jury . .. and the evidence
relied upon by the state fully warranted finding, beyond any rea-
sonable doubt, that the defendants . . . feloniously took each of
the automobiles without the owner's consent and against his will,
with intent to convert it to the use of defendants. In doing that,
the defendants clearly committed larceny * ** as to each auto-
mobile.55
The language of Schroeder differs from the Code's description of the
mental element, but there is no reason to believe that the Criminal Code
intended a change in the law. What the Code as well as the decided cases
appear to be doing is proscribing acts accompanied by the intentional
creation of an unreasonable risk of permanent loss to the owner.56 Ac-
cordingly, the jury may find the necessary element where the actor takes
property for temporary use and abandons it under circumstances
amounting to a "reckless exposure to loss." The criminal law must act
upon probabilities and risks rather than upon hindsight.
To determine intent the jury must take into consideration all the
evidence and it need not accept the defendant's declarations of intent.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has stated:
... intent is a state of mind which can be evidenced only by the
words or conduct of the person who is claimed to have enter-
tained it. The jury was under no obligation to accept the direct
evidence of intent furnished by the defendant, and must be per-
mitted to infer intent from such of defendant's acts as objectively
evidence his state of mind.57
D. Theft under 943.20(1)b.
1. General comments.
Most of the pre-Criminal Code law of embezzlement is included in
this section. 58 Because common law larceny required a taking out of the
55 Schroeder v. State, supra note 53.
56 Sec. 206.6, Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #2, p. 88, Perkins, CRIMINAL
LAW, 225.
57 State v. Kuenzli, 208 Wis. 340, 347, 242 N.W. 147, 149 (1932); see also, State
v. Legg, 243 Wis. 449, 10 N.W. 2d 187 (1943); Mueller v. State, 208 Wis. 550,
243 N.W. 411 (1932); State v. Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 229 N.W. 54 (1930);
Adrian v. State, 191 Wis. 193, 210 N.W. 367 (1926). judge Learned Hand has
expressed this poignantly:
"We have no ways of reaching each other's minds, but by the rude
standard of assuming that men are alike, and checking the assumption
by the appearance and demeanor of the individual. Perhaps there are
better ways, but many a man has lost his liberty, and will lose it, for no
better reason than because twelve ordinary men concluded that what
most men would have believed he believed; because he could not con-
vince them that he was egregious in this way or in that. This was a
scheme which did, and on every sane theory must, fleece the unsophisti-
cated. If these defendants thought otherwise, like all of us, they stood
in peril to satisfy their peers of their obtusity. . . ." Knickerbocker Mer-
chandising Co. v. United States, 13 F. 2d 544 (2d Cir. 1926).
58 The prior law was in two sections.
Section 343.20 was the general embezzlement section. It set out a long list of
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possession of the owner, an appropriation by a person in lawful pos-
session became criminal only upon the passage of embezzlement statutes.
These statutes were of limited coverage and did not affect all misap-
propriations by persons in lawful possession. The impact of 943.20(1)b
is restricted as to persons and property affected.59
Loss by embezzlement constitutes a major risk in business. In a
single year it has been estimated American industry will lose about one
billion dollars as a result of embezzlement and related crimes.60 Com-
pensation through insurance is frequently dependent upon proof that
embezzlement occurred because of "mysterious disappearance" clauses.
Accordingly the elements of this crime are of importance in civil law
as well.
2. Persons Affected by 943.20(1)b.
This subsection applies only to persons bearing a particular kind of
relationship to the object appropriated, and who bear a special responsi-
bility toward the owner. The accused must have possession or custody
by virtue of his ". . . office, business or employment, or as trustee or
bailee. . . ." The persons to whom the law applies are denoted by a
simple description of the relationship which they hold rather than by
an extensive enumeration as given in the pre-Criminal Code provision.
Some of these were:
... factor, carrier, warehouseman, storage, forwarding or com-
mission merchant, or any bailee, executor, administrator, guard-
ian, or any trustee, agent, clerk, attorney, messenger, employee
or servant... .1
The long and involved list grew as more situations of the owner-pos-
sessor-property relationship were recognized, and legislation to cover
their misappropriations was required. The Criminal Code covers the
same persons but with language which describes in functional terms the
situations in which the actor in possession or custody of property could be
guilty of embezzlement for misappropriating it. The actor had to come within
a class of persons listed in the statute.
343.37, the section on fraud by corporation officers contained a provision
reading: "Any director, officer or manager of a body corporate or public com-
pany who shall as such receive or possess himself of any money or other
property of such body corporate or public company otherwise than in payment
to him of a just debt or demand .... Although this provision did not ex-
pressly require criminal intent, the actor probably would not have been found
guilty if he were mistaken as to the debt or demand.
5 The Proposed Code would have eliminated entirely the separate treatment of
fiduciaries who misappropriated. The offense of "stealing" would have in-
cluded one who:
"with intent to appropriate the property to his own use, intentionally
takes, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of the property of
another without his consent .. "
60 37 HARvRD BusiNzss REVIEw 72 (1959).




classes of persons included. The problem under the Criminal Code is
to determine whether a person's functions permit him to be prosecuted
under this subsection. If the actor bears the relation of debtor to his
victim there will be no criminal liability under this subsection. However,
there may be criminal liability if the misappropriating actor is a bailee.
This distinction was not infrequently litigated under the old law, where
courts demonstrated a tendency to look through the form and at the
essence of the relationship beyond. The point to be emphasized is that
courts and legislatures continue to be reluctant to take any path which
will make criminal an ordinary breach of contract.
For the purposes of assessing criminal liability, the role of bailee
has been broadly defined by Wisconsin courts.
If one, without the trespass which characterizes ordinary larceny,
comes into possession of any personalty of another and is in duty
bound to exercise some degree of care to preserve and restore
the thing to such other or to some other person for that other, or
otherwise account for the property as that of such other, accord-
ing to circumstances,--he is a bailee. It is the element of lawful
possession, however created, and duty to account for the thing
as the property of another, that creates the bailment, regardless
of whether such possession is based on contract in the ordinary
sense or not."2
In Stecher v. State,6 3 the defendant engaged in a number of financial
transactions in which he informed several complainants of investment
possibilities. To induce one victim to part with money the defendant
told him of an opportunity in Chicago in which the defendant planned
to invest. In return for the sum of $12,000 the defendant gave his notes
and agreed to pay interest. The money was misappropriated and the
defendant was convicted of embezzlement. On appeal the defendant
contended that the relationship between him and his victim "was that
of debtor and creditor rather than principal and agent or bailor and
bailee." He argued that his promise to repay coupled with the obligation
to pay interest was proof of the creditor-debtor relationship. The court
in an opinion by Judge Rosenberry disposed of this contention by
stating:
While the defendant went through the motions of paying interest
and acting as if he had made the investments as he represented
he would do, it is equally apparent that he never had any inten-
tion of making the investments. There is nothing in the record
which required the trial court to make any such inference or
which raises a reasonable doubt as to the nature of the trans-
action.6
62 Burns v. State, supra note 16.
63 202 Wis. 25, 231 N.W. at 168 (1930).
64 Stecher v. State, supra note 63 at 30, 231 N.W. at 170.
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The Stecher case was distinguished in Hanser v. State65 where the ac-
cused suggested to complainants that they join with him and go into the
soap-making business. In return for money to finance the purchase of
the needed facilities the defendant gave the complainants his note. A
factory was purchased by defendant, but title thereto was taken in
defendant's own name. The complainants demanded their interest in the
property, but the defendant refused to convey it. Instead, in response
to the demand of the complainants, the defendant gave the complain-
ants notes signed by defendant's wife. The defendant was prosecuted
for embezzlement as a bailee or trustee. A conviction for embezzlement
was reversed, Judge Rosenberry again writing the opinion of the court.
It is elementary law that liabilities growing out of a debtor-
creditor relationship cannot be made the basis of a charge of
embezzlement. It is equally well settled that where a note is given
not in good faith, but merely as a part of a fraudulent scheme of
obtaining possession of money from another, the mere giving of
the note does not determine conclusively the nature of the trans-
action [citing Strecher]. No circumstances at all comparable to
those in the Strecher Case appear in this case....
Upon the evidence there can be no doubt that the three men
engaged in some sort of joint enterprise for their mutual benefit.
The record is barren of any evidence which shows that the re-
lationship between the defendant and [complainant] . . . was
... anything other than that of debtor and creditor.66
The fact that a person agrees to pay interest may be evidence of the
relationship of debtor-creditor, 6 although the cases indicate that the
courts will examine the transaction in question carefully in order to
determine the true nature of the relationship."
Some difficulty has been encountered in determining the issue of
whether a person can be convicted for the embezzlement of property
held in trust not by himself but by a corporation or other entity in
which the defendant plays an important role. In Milbrath v. State69 the
court sustained a conviction in the face of the defendant's claim that
the criminal acts had been accomplished by a corporation, not by him-
self. The court emphasized the high degree of control exercised by the
65 217 Wis. 587, 259 N.W. 418 (1935).
66 Hanser v. State, supra note 65 at 592-593, 259 N.W. at 419-420.
67 Milwaukee Theater Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 92 Wis. 412, 66 N.W. 360
(1896). In this case the treasurer of a corporation had $6,000 in his posses-
sion upon which he agreed to pay 6% interest. When his job as treasurer
terminated he failed to pay the $6,000 on demand. This was held not to consti-
stitute an embezzlement on the ground that: "There can be no embezzlement
unless the property charged to have been embezzled was, at the time of the
conversion, held in trust."
68 See also State v. McFetridge, 84 Wis. 473, 505, 54 N.W. 1, 7 (1893) wherein
the legal title of monies paid to the state treasurer was held to lie with the
state.
69 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W. 252 (1909).
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defendant over the corporate activities (the defendant was president
and four-fifth owner of the stock) and concluded:
. ..in a criminal prosecution against a person charged with an
offense committed by him against the laws of the state he could
not be heard to say in justification that he committed that offense
in his official capacity as officer of a corporation; nor could he
assert that acts in forum corporate acts were not his acts merely
because carried out by him through the instrumentality of a cor-
poration which he controlled and dominated in all respects and
which he employed for that purpose.70
The Milbrath case was distinguished in Weber v. State.71 In the latter
case the defendant, a young man of 27, was secretary-treasurer and vice-
president of a real estate and loan company. He was only a nominal
stockholder, and had achieved his position by promotion from the posi-
tion as a stenographer and office boy. Complainants paid certain sums
to the company through the defendant for the purpose of paying off
debts due to third parties. The funds were deposited in the company's
general accounts and in violation of the obligation were not used for
the purposes directed. After the bankruptcy of the company the de-
fendant was prosecuted for embezzlement. The conviction was reversed,
the court emphasizing the subordinate position held by the defendant
rather than the power implied by his title.
3. Possession or custody "by virtue" of such office.
To convict under 943.20 (1) b the prosecution must prove not only the
special relationship but also that defendant "by virtue of his office..."
had possession or custody of the matter appropriated. The statute here
incorporates language found in the prior law.7 2
In Sprague v. State,3 the defendant who had connections with a
bank abstracted bank funds with the intent to defraud the bank. He
was convicted under the special theft statute pertaining to banking offi-
cers.74 This statute differs from the embezzlement statute in that for
70 138 Wis. at 364-365, 120 N.W. at 256.
71190 Wis. 257, 208 N.W. 923 (1926) ; accord, Kralovetz v. State, 191 Wis. 374,
211 N.W. 277 (1926). Judge Rosenberry dissented in the Kralovetz opinion
although he had concurred in Weber. In the former case he states:
"... if it is to be held, as it seems to me it is held in the present case,
that an employee of a corporation who, by virtue of such employment,
is entrusted with the disbursement of money, fraudulently converts it to
the use of the corporation of which he is an employee, is not guilty of
embezzlement, I cannot concur in that view." (191 Wis. at 378, 211 N.W.
at 278).
The majority did not contravene this, but merely relied on the Weber hold-
ing. On the law Judge Rosenberry's point seems well taken.
72 WIS. STAT. §34320 (1953).
73 188 Wis. 432, 206 N.W. 69 (1925).74 Wis. STAT. §221.39 (1959) now provides:
"Every president, director, cashier, officer, teller, clerk or agent of any
bank or mutual savings bank who steals, abstracts or willfully misapplies any
of the moneys, funds, credits, or property of the bank or mutual savings
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the latter the state would have to show that the defendant had lawful
custody of the funds.
The same problem arose in State v. White,7 5 where the defendant
was comptroller of the City of Milwaukee. He had possession of 100
municipal bonds, 92 of which he issued to persons authorized to receive
them, but the other eight he pledged as security for a personal loan.
On appeal from a conviction for embezzlement the defendant argued
that he did not have possession of the bonds by "virtue of such office
or employment." To sustain the conviction the Court had to make a
lengthy analysis of the duties of the comptroller and concluded:
His duty to make an accurate record of the bonds issued, rendered
it absolutely necessary that he should have the custody of them
after they were ready for issue to make such record, and it would
certainly be convenient, if not absolutely necessary, that he should
retain such custody until they were delivered to the persons en-
titled to them, in order to make the accurate account of issuing
the bonds as required by law.6
The lesson of the White case is that the Courts will consider the
broad nature of a person's office or employment and consider such
matters as business or governmental convenience to determine whether
custody or possession is "by virtue" of such office.
4. Property Affected.
943.20(1)b limits the object of the offense to "... money or a negoti-
able security, instrument, paper or other negotiable writing ... ." Thus
it would appear that a person, in lawful possession of a valuable stamp
collection lent to him by a friend, who subsequently converts the collec-
tion to his own use by transferring valuable stamps from the collection
to his own collection will not be guilty of a criminal offense under
943.20(1)b.7 The property affected by 943.20(1)b is matter which by
virtue of its highly transferable characteristics may be easily lost unless
bank, whether owned by it or held in trust, or who, without authority of the
directors, issues or puts forth any certificate of deposit, draws any order or
bill of exchange, makes any acceptance, assigns any note, bond, draft, bill of
exchange, mortgage, judgment or decree; or who makes any false entry in any
book, report or statement of the bank with intent in either case to injure or
defraud the bank or mutual savings bank or any person or corporation, or to
deceive any officer of the bank or mutual savings bank, or any other person,
or any agent appointed to examine the affairs of such bank or mutual savings
bank; or any person who, with like intent, aids, or abets any officer, clerk, or
agent in the violation of this section, upon conviction thereof shall be im-
prisoned in the state prison not to exceed 20 years."
7566 Wis. 343, 28 N.W. 202 (1886).
76 State v. White, supra note 75 at 354; see also State v. McFetridge, supra note
68.
77 Authority for sustaining a conviction even under the old law may be found
in the "breaking bulk" cases, or in the larceny by trick cases-see the fa-
mous Pear's Case, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (1779). The defendant who
wrongfully conceals or withholds the property of another with an intent per-




the criminal law accords to it a greater degree of protection. The
property affected is defined in terms of its negotiability thus not per-
mitting the application of the section to other freely transferable items.
5. Of Another.7 8
If the funds taken are held on loan they are not, of course, the prop-
erty "of another." In State v. Legg,7 9 the defendant, charged with em-
bezzling $170 delivered to him by the complainant, claimed that the
money was turned over to him as a loan. This would have been a de-
fense if he could have so shown.80 The offense specified by 943.20(1)b
is against the property "of another."
The criminal law in some jurisdictions has distinguished between
withholding money which belongs to another and failing to pay money
which is due to another. Commonwealth v. Mitchneck, a Pennsylvania
decision, is a leading case.81 Employees of Mitchneck, a mine operator,
authorized him to deduct from the wages amounts due on grocery bills.
Mitchneck was to pay the grocer the sums due, but he did not, although
he did make the deductions. The Pennsylvania statute punished persons
who:
having received or having possession, in any capacity . . . any
money .. . of or belong to another. . ., fraudulently withholds,
converts, or applies the same . . . to and for his own use or
benefit... (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court reversed the conviction on the ground that Mitchneck did not
have in his possession "any money belonging to his employees." Mitch-
neck's obligation, said the Court, was a civil one due to his employees
or to the grocer. If one determines that there would have been liability
if the employees after drawing their pay had given the money to Mitch-
neck for the purpose of paying the grocer, the case emphasizes a need-
less fiction. In the latter situation a trust relationship would have been
clear enough to allow a conviction for embezzlement.8 2 The Wisconsin
Criminal Code could properly be construed to punish such persons as
Mitchneck in view of the clause in 943.20(1)b concerning the "... office,
business or employment . . ." of the defendant. Mitchneck was in a
real sense "employed" by his own employees to set aside, either physi-
cally or on account books certain sums for a particular purpose. The
employees themselves assumed none of the risks frequently attendant
upon professional lenders, and it was not contemplated that Mitchneck
hold the money for any length of time or for any use to his own benefit.
78 See discussion under 943.20(1)a. supra.
79243 Wis. 449, 10 N.W. 2d 187 (1943).
so Id. at 189; see also Milwaukee Theater Co. v. Fidelity & Gas Co., supra note 67.
81130 Pa. Super. 433, 198 Atl. 463 (1938), see also State v. Polzin, 197 Wash.
612, 85 P2d 1057 (1939) discussed in Appendix C, Model Penal Code, Tenta-
tive Draft #1; see also Comment to 206.4, Tentative Draft #2.
82 Cf. State v. Polzin, supra note 81.
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It was not a "credit" transaction and in a very real sense he held the
money "of another." It was expected that Mitchneck would retain a
specific amount of cash as immediately available for a particular pur-
pose. In Wisconsin the courts even prior to the Criminal Code demon-




The requisite action for a conviction under 943.20(1)b is an in-
tentional use, transfer, concealment or retention of specified property
without the owner's consent. The behavior described in 943.20(1)b
amounts to dealing with property as if it were the actor's own. It is the
purpose of the Criminal Code to proscribe such a conflict with the right
of the true owner."
In Milbrath v. State,8 5 the Court was careful to emphasize that the
test of requisite action for embezzlement was not the benefit to the de-
fendant,"' but the use by the defendant. The fact that the property was
held in trust by a corporation of which the defendant was an officer and
director and used for the benefit of the corporation does not preclude
the defendant from being held responsible for an embezzlement.8 7
So long as the person's actions are within the scope of his duties as
they are defined by law or by agreement there is no violation of
943.20(1)b, although he may intend at some future time to convert the
funds to his own use.88 In State v. McFeteridge the Court stated:
The deposits having been made for the benefit of the state, by
the state treasurer in his official capacity, in due course of busi-
ness, with the intention, afterwards executed, to pay the amounts
thereof to the persons lawfully entitled thereto, the intention
formed in his mind to retain to his own use any interest the bank
might thereafter pay him on account of such deposits is not suffi-
cient to characterize the act of making such deposits as a con-
version to his own use of the funds thus deposited, and an em-
bezzlement thereof.8 9
83 Stecher v. State, supra note 63.
84 Sec. 206.4 Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft #2, states: Thefts by Failure
to Make Required Disposition of Funds Received. (1) In General. A person
who obtains property upon agreement, or subject to a known legal obligation,
to make specified payment or other disposition, whether from such property
or its proceeds or from his own property in equivalent amount, commits theft
if he deals with the property obtained as his own and fails to make the re-
quired payment or disposition, unless the actor proves that his obligation in
the transaction was limited to a promise or other duty to be performed in the
future without any present duty to reserve property for such performance....
(emphasis supplied)
85 Supra note 69.
86 138 Wis. 354 at 363, 120 N.W. at 255, see also State v. Sanders, 127 Kan. 481,
274 Pac. 223 (1929) dicta.
8 138 Wis. 354 at 364.
Il State v. McFeteridge, supra note 68 at 8-9.




The requisite action must have been done "without the owner's con-
sent." Consent therefore is a defense under 943.20(1)b just as it was
under the prior law. "Without consent" is defined in 939.22(48).
In Guenther v. State,90 the defendant was accused of embezzling
from his employer. Among the defenses was the claim that at the time
of his employment he was told that his employer "doesn't want his men
to be living in poverty, so if you need a little money-at first you may
need some of the money used for sales and pay it back when you are
able." The Court held this was not consent to an appropriation of $850.
"It at most authorized trifling applications of moneys . . . and not a
diversion of large sums....-91
8. The Mental Element in 943.20(1) b.
The gravamen of the theft described in 943.20(1)b is described as
the defendant's ". . . intent to convert to his own use or to the use of
any other person except the owner." It is quite different from the intent
required by subsection (1)a for under subsection (1)b the risk of loss
to the owner of money or negotiable instruments is decidedly greater
because of their easily disposable quality. An intention to return, there-
fore, a defense under subsection (1)a, is no defense to theft under
subsection (1)b.9 ' In this respect the Criminal Code is in accord with
prior law, and cases decided thereunder are helpful.93
The prior statute referred to a conversion to the defendants ".
own use or to the use of any other person except the owner. . .""' and
the Criminal Code was amended during the 1959 session to embrace
the language of the old law. Such a conversion may occur when the
actor transfers the property for the benefit of another, uses or withholds
the property, or intentionally takes any other action for the purpose of
depriving the owner of the property.
A technical conversion, although it may be sufficient to constitute
requisite action, may not by itself be an indication of an intent to
appropriate to the use of the actor. The jury is entitled to consider all
circumstances. In State ex rel Kropf v .Gilbert,"- a trustee corporation
sold certain securities of a client before being authorized to do so. The
act, sufficient to fulfill the demands of the embezzlement statute, was held
not criminal so long as the proceeds obtained were kept for the client.
by a concealment of the property may be sufficient, see State v. Holley, 115
W.Va. 464, 177 S.E. 302 (1934).
90 137 Wis. 183, 118 N.W. 640 (1908).
91 Id. at 188, 642.
92 Glasheen v. State, 188 Wis. 268, 205 N.W. 820 (1925) ; State v. Pratt, 114 Kan.
660, 220 Pac. 505 (1923).
93 See McGeever v. State, 239 Wis. 87, 300 N.W. 485 (1941); Podell v. State,
228 Wis. 513, 273 N.W. 653 (1938); Mueller v. State, supra note 57.
SWis. STAT. §343.20 (1953).
95 213 Wis. 196, 251 N.W. 478 (1933).
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Embezzlement did occur upon the subsequent conversion of the funds
to the use of the trustees. In Adrian v. State,"G an agent deposited to
his own account funds belonging to the principal contrary to the terms
of his obligation. The Court affirmed a conviction for embezzlement, but
in deliberate dicta indicated that a mere technical conversion would not
supply that element of fraud necessary for embezzlement. The Court
stated:
The mere deposit by an agent in the ordinary course of business
of funds belonging to a principal in his own bank account and so
intermingling it with his own funds undoubtedly amounts to a
technical conversion . . . but it may lack the element of fraud
necessary to constitute a fraudulent conversion.
The present Code does not refer to fraud as necessary for a conviction
under 943.20(1)b. It does not follow, however, that the Code differs
here from the prior law. The element of fraud was recited in the prior
law and in cases because of the natural unwillingness of Courts to make
an ordinary breach of contract the basis for criminal liability. The old
statute required that the State prove an element of "fraud" in order to
prevent such a result. In State v. Kuenzli,97 the Court said:
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant deposited the
money in his own account, and that he thereafter used the money
for his own benefit. It is true that whether these acts on the part
of the defendant constituted mere conversion or embezzlement
depends upon the intent with which they were done.
The Kuenzli case teaches that an intentional conversion is neces-
sary. The mere use of the funds, in the absence of an intentional use
is not enough. However, from a use of funds a jury may infer the de-
liberate and intentional element required. The old law permitted an infer-
ence of a fraudulent and felonious intent on the basis of an intentional
use,98 but the Criminal Code eliminates this technicality and merely
requires that the jury consider all the facts and circumstances before it
can conclude that there was an intentional conversion to the defendant's
use. 943.20(1)b thus recites the mental element in a manner more pre-
cise, but no different in effect, than the common law. Confusion arising
from the phrase "fraudulent and felonious" is eliminated.
To "convert to his own use" the defendant must be more than
negligent or careless. What was said under the old embezzlement statute
obtains equally under the Code.
A man may do things irregularly; he may do poor bookkeeping;
he may be very careless; he may sign a receipt, as he did here,
96 Supra note 57.
97Ibid. note 5.
9s State v. Legg, supra note 57; Lochner v. State, 218 Wis. 472, 261 N.W. 227
(1935); Mueller v. State, supra note 57; Glasheen v. State, supra note 92;
State v. Leicham, 41 Wis. 565, (1877).
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for money which, concedely, he never received; he may even be
guilty of malfeasance in office, of failure to properly keep the
accounts and to make daily entries and so on as 59.73 provides,
but you cannot convict him of embezzlement for that.9
9. Proof of Intent.
The jury may infer the necessary intent from the actions of the
accused subsequent to the "use" of the property. In Adrian v. State,100
the defendant deposited funds of his principal in the defendant's own
account, withdrew the entire amount and left the state. These actions
permitted the jury to find that he had converted the funds to his own
use with the "evident purpose of depriving the beneficiary of his
rights." 01
The defendant in State v. Kuenzli,10 2 was an attorney who collected
an account on behalf of a client and deposited the check received as
payment in his own bank account. Defendant claims that he waited a
few days to determine whether the check was good and upon finding
that it was, he also discovered that his bank account was insufficient to
pay the client. A conviction for embezzlement was sustained, the Court
holding:
The jury was under no obligation to accept the direct evidence
of intent furnished by the defendant, and must be permitted to
infer intent from such of defendant's acts as objectively evidence
his state of mind. It seems clear to us that the deposit and subse-
quent use of the funds by defendant for his own benefit may
properly form the basis for an inference of felonious intent.1 0 3
That the defendant acts openly with the property and with the
knowledge of the true owner may be evidence of the lack of an intent
to convert.1 0 4 It is also, of course, relevant to determine whether the de-
fendant fled following the use. 05 It is not a defense to show that the
defendant did not in fact benefit himself, for the test is whether the
the defendant converted to his own use, not to his own benefit. 00 Loose
language in some decisions referring to the intent of the defendant to
"benefit" himself can be found. It is true, of course, that in the majority
of cases the defendant's intent to benefit himself was the reason for the
taking, but this does not mean that a benefit to the defendant is an
essential element of the crime.
" State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 436, 10 N.W. 2d 117, (1943).
100 Supra note 57.
101 Adrian v. State, supra note 57 at 197; accord, Stecher v .State, supra note 63
at 30, where the Court stated "It is sufficient evidence of unlawful conversion
to show as in these cases that the defendant absconded, following efforts of
the complainants to procure a settlement with him."
10 2 Supra note 97.
103 State v. Kuenzli, supra note 57 at 347.
104 Hanser v. State, 217 Wis. 587, 591, 259 N.W. 418 (1935).
105 Adrian v. State, supra note 57 at 193; Stecher v. State, supra note 63 at 30.
100 Milbrath v. State, supra note 69; see also State v. Witte, supra note 99 at 435.
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In State v. Davidson 1°07 a conversion sufficient to sustain a conviction
for embezzlement was proven by showing that funds were deposited in
defendant's personal account, intermingled with his funds, or not turned
over to the owner in accordance with defendant's obligation.0 On the
other hand in State v. Witte,"0 9 a conviction for embezzlement was
reversed on the ground that an intent to convert was not established.
In this case the accused, a clerk of courts, was shown to have kept in-
accurate records, and a shortage was discovered after an audit. How-
ever:
It was not shown on the part of the state that the defendant
expended any of the money for his personal use. No checks were
drawn on the funds deposited in the name of the county to the
defendant ... or to any person for the use of the defendant.
... All checks were properly issued for payments legally payable
from those funds." 0
It was further shown that defendant made no false entries, requested an
audit to be made, appointed a new deputy when the old one proved in-
competent, and had the safe combination changed after his superior had
neglected to do so.
10. Prima facie evidence under 943.20(1) b.
The last sentence in 943.20(1)b provides that a "... refusal to
deliver . . ." items specified ". . . upon demand of the person entitled
to receive it, or as required by law, is prima facie evidence of an intent
to convert to his own use. . . ." Except that the prior statute referred
also to a "wilful neglect" to deliver, this provision is identical in effect
to the pre-code law."' The refusal to pay on demand is only prima facie
evidence of a conversion; the accused may rebut the presumption by
proof of circumstances that would disprove the conversion." 2 Of course
a demand is not a condition precedent for prosecution.
If certain facts are made prima facie evidence of a crime this per-
mits the inference of an element of the crime from the facts. The facts
will thereby constitute evidence which should be considered by the jury
together with other evidence in determining whether they are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." 3
E. Theft under 943.20(1)c.
Subsection (1)c proscribes the conduct of a person who having a
legal interest in movable property, takes it out of the possession of an-
107 242 Wis. 406, 8 N.W. 2d 275 (1943).
108 Id. at 413.
109 Supra note 106.
1 0 State v. Witte, supra note 99 at 435.
"' See Wis. STAT. §343.21 (1953).
12 Glasheen v. State, supra note 92.,




other with superior right of possession. He must act with intent to
defeat the other's interest in the property, or must believe that his act
will effect a permanent deprivation of another of a superior right of
possession.
An illustration of how this section might work is supplied by a
Minnesota decision, State v. Cohen."114 The defendant was the owner of
a Hudson seal fur coat which was delivered to the complainant, a
furrier, for alterations. A fictitious name was given by the owner's
husband at the time of delivery, and when the coat was ready the de-
fendant refused to pay. The furrier refused to deliver the coat without
payment, and there matters stood for several weeks. After repeated
efforts to get paid the furrier took the coat to defendant's home. De-
fendant took the coat for the announced purpose of trying it on before
a mirror; the furrier was left waiting at the door. The defendant in
response to repeated requests refused to pay for the alterations or return
the coat to the furrier. On this evidence the Court sustained a conviction
for larceny on the ground that the evidence could disclose an intention
to deprive the furrier of his lien. Hence a person can be guilty of larceny
where the object taken is his own property if another has a superior
right to possession, and if the taking is intended to result in a depriva-
tion of that right."15
The requisite act under 943.20(1)c is a taking of unauthorized con-
trol by taking possession. The common law is in accord because of the
definition given to property "of another." "Of another" has referred to
possession rather than to title or ownership.i"
F. Theft under 943.20(1)d.
This subsection embodies the common law crime of obtaining by
false pretenses, although in one respect the new statute covers behavior
not within the common law definition. The simplification achieved by
subsection d enabled the legislature to repeal several troublesome stat-
utes.117 943.20(1)d deals with theft by deceit, as distinguished from
14 196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W. 922 (1935). See also cases cited in Clark and Mar-
shall, LAW oF CRiMEs (6th ed. by Wengersky 1958) 725.
"Is State v. Williamson, 74 Wis. 263, 42 N.W. 111 (1889).
:'I6 See Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW, 196 (1957).
17 Obtaining property by false pretenses. The following sections dealt with the
crime of obtaining by false pretenses and related offenses. The new section
differs from the old law on false pretenses in that a promise made with intent
not to perform it is now included, if it is part of a false and fraudulent
scheme.
343.24 False pretenses; personating another; penalty, 343.25 Obtaining
money by false pretenses; penalty, and 343.253 Mendicant impostors all dealt
with obtaining property by false pretenses or false personation.
343.31 Gross fraud provided a penalty for a gross fraud or cheat at com-
mon law. Those common-law crimes dealt with obtaining property by means
of fraud which affected the public-false weights and measures for example.
343.32 Sale of land without title prohibited executing a deed of land to
which one had no title-a false representation that the person owned the land.
343.341 Manufacture and distribution of cheating tokens, etc.; Subsection
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theft by stealth. Hence the element of trespass, a requisite of common
law larceny, is not present. Absent also is the lawful possession of cus-
tody present in the crime of embezzlement (and in 943.20(1)b).
1. Obtains Title to Property.
The actor must "obtain title" to the property of another. This re-
quirement is a carry over from the old law which required that the vic-
tim relinquish property intending to transfer not only possession but
title also. Accordingly, a person might or might not be guilty of a crime
if he obtained the property by a false promise, depending on whether
he obtained title to the property or only possession of it. The crime of
false pretenses required that the actor obtain title to the property.
118
The rule was stated in forceful terms in Bates v. State,11 9 and State
v. Burke120-- as long as the defrauded party retained either title or con-
trol over the property the crime of obtaining by false pretenses was not
consummated. This requirement was qualified in Whitmore v. State, 21
wherein the Court stated:
The rule stated in the Bates and Burke Cases is not founded upon
a specific requirement in the statute that title pass, but is for the
purpose of preserving a distinction between the crime of larceny
by bailee and that of obtaining money by false pretenses ...
Where ... goods are sold under a conditional sales contract and
the legal title is retained for purposes of security, the vendee
gets a sufficient property interest to support a conviction of ob-
(2) prohibited the use of anything except lawful money in any receptacle used
for deposit of coins, with intent to defraud. If he obtained a candy bar or a
package of cigarettes, he would be guilty under subsection (1) (a) because
technically he obtains the property without the consent of the owner, since
his consent is given only to the taking in return for lawful money.
343.35 False pretense as to heirship penalized anyone pretending that a
child was of certain parents in order to obtain an inheritance to which the
child of those parents would be entitled. This was a specific attempt to steal
and if property is obtained by this false representation, the actor is guilty of
theft under the new section; if no property is obtained, but the actor does the
acts prohibited he probably is guilty of an attempted theft.
343.405 Fraud on life insurance company penalized anyone who absconded
or concealed himself to obtain the proceeds of a life insurance policy; it even
penalized the taking out of a policy with intent to abscond or conceal oneself
to obtain the proceeds of the policy. If the actor does obtain property by such
false representation, he is clearly guilty of theft. If he absconds or conceals
himself and his intent to procure the proceeds of the policy can be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt he may be guilty of an attempt under section
939.32. Otherwise such conduct is -not sufficiently dangerous to be criminal.
343.41 False statements; penalty dealt with the making of false financial
statements in order to obtain bonds, credit or the extension of credit and
provided that, if such statement was relied on and actual financial loss sus-
tained, a punishable offense was committed.
343.571 Warehouse receipts, frauds respecting, prohibited the use of false
warehouse receipts, or of genuine warehouse receipts with false conditions
on them, to obtain several types of specified property.
118 Brockman v. State, 192 Wis. 15, 211 N.W. 936 (1927) ; State v. Kube, 20 Wis.
229 (1886).
:9 124 Wis. 612, 617, 103 N.W. 251 (1905).
120 Supra note 6.
121238 Wis. 79, 298 N.W. 194 (1941).
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taining money by false pretenses provided the other requisites
of the offense are present.2 2?
Although the Criminal Code explicitly refers to the necessity for title to
be obtained this should not be taken to mean that one must obtain abso-
lute title, because any title obtained by fraud is voidable and the require-
ment if applied literally would make it impossible for the crime to be
consummated. 2  The Whitmore case adopted this reasoning in sustain-
ing a conviction of a defendant who purchased with a bad check an
automobile on a conditional sales contract, in which title was reserved in
the vendor.
24
The result in Whitmore appears to be sensible for it goes to the heart
of the law of theft and proscribes the obtaining of unauthorized control.
Language of title is a misleading relic of distinctions no longer sig-
nificant. In view of the Whitmore case the maxim cessante ratione legis,
cessat et ipsa lex could be applied, and the courts could properly con-
cern themselves with the unauthorized control exercised by the de-
fendant.
The requirement refers to obtaining title to property. 25 Hence it is
not criminal under this subsection to induce another to render personal
services by false representation,"2 6 or to induce another to extend
credit."2 Criminal liability, if any, must be founded on other sections
of the code or statutes.
28
2. Victim must be deceived.
The victim must in fact be deceived."2 9 It makes no difference that
the victim was careless to the point of stupidity and that the deception
would not have fooled a reasonable man. In Palotta v. State,"30 the
Court stated that the theft statutes were designed to protect "the unwise
and credulous as well as the able and the vigilant."'' 3 While it may be
22 Id. at 82, 195.
123 Chappell v. State, 216 Ind. 666, 25 N.E. 2d 999 (1939) ; Clark and Marshall,
LAw OF CRIMEs (6th ed. 1958) 818; Perkins, CRIMINAL LAW, 260 (1957).
224 Cf. La Porte Motor Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 209 Wis. 397, 245 N.W. 105
(1932) wherein it was held that the vendee of an automobile by a conditional
sales contract cannot be guilty of larceny of the automobile even though in
default under the conditional sale.
"25 Defined broadly in 943.20(2) a; see Clawson v. State, 129 Wis. 650, 109 N.W.
578 (1906) (a promissory note); State v. White, 66 Wis. 343, 28 N.W. 202(1886) (unissued city bonds), 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 145 (1935).
126 State v. Black, 75 Wis. 490, 44 N.W. 635 (1890), 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 811, 12 Op.
Atty. Gen. 132, 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 376.
L27 Pepin v. State ex rel Chambers, 217 Wis. 568, 259 N.W. 410 (1935) ; Lochner
v. State, supra note 48.
128 See 943.21 Fraud on Hotel or Restaurant Keeper; 943.38 Forgery, or 943.39
Fraudulent Writing.
"29 Corscot v. State, 178 Wis. 661, 190 N.W. 465 (1922).
130 184 Wis. 290, 199 N.W. 72 (1924).
"'3 Id. at 294, 74, rejecting the principle announced in State v. Green, 7 Wis.
676 (1859) and State v. Kube, supra note 118. See also State ex rel Hull v.
Larson, 226 Wis. 585, 277 N.W. 101 (1938) wherein the victim, Dane County,
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that the representation is so utterly absurd that no person could possibly
be deceived and the court might so rule, if it in fact is disclosed that
the victim was deceived this will fulfill the requirement.
Not only must the victim be deceived, but he must be deprived of
something as a result of the deception. In Whitmore v. State,132 the
defendant claimed that the state must prove that the victim parted with
the property in sole reliance upon the false pretense. The Court rejected
this contention and stated that it is sufficient "if the pretense was one
of the material matters relied upon." 133
The reliance of the victim may be inferred by the jury if the false
representations are proved and the requisite intention to deceive is es-
tablished.13 4 However, it does not appear to be essential that the victim
suffer an actual property loss." 5 A conviction for false pretenses was
sustained in Nelson v. United States."-6 The defendant, a television re-
tailer, purchased television sets worth $272 on credit. The purchase
price was secured by a chattel mortgage and a car in which the defendant
claimed a four thousand dollar interest. The car in fact had a lien upon
it and was worth only one thousand dollars to the defendant. Although
the complainant suffered no monetary loss at the time of the misrepre-
sentations the Court held that false pretenses obtained because the com-
plainant was deprived of his right to bargain with all the facts before
him.
3. A False Representation.
A significant enlargement upon the crime of false pretenses is made
by 943.20(1)d and should be remarked. A false representation now
"... includes a promise made with intent not to perform if it is part of
a false and fraudulent scheme."" 37 The old dogma was that a promise
of future action did not constitute false representation, but a single
sentence reduces this rubric to a state of limbo." 8 "A mere naked prom-
was deceived because of the negligence of its agents. A conviction was sus-
tained.
"'32238 Wis. 79, 298 N.W. 194 (1941).
33 Id. at 82, 195; accord State ex rel Brill v. Spieker, 271 Wis. 237, 242, 72 N.W.
2d 906 (1955).
134 Corscot v. State, supra note 129.
"' cf. State v. Hintz, 200 Wis. 636, 229 N.W. 54 (1930) where defendant falsely
represented that soil was clay and loam when in fact it was poor quality white
sand. Complainant gave defendant a mortgage relying upon the representa-
tion as to the quality of the soil. The record indicated that defendant in-
tended to pay the mortgage. The Court reversed and ordered a new trial on
the ground that there was serious doubt as to defendant's guilt. Where there
is evidence that defendant did not intent to cause the victim loss, there may
be a discretionary reversal under Section 251.09.
136227 F. 2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1955) noted 65 Yale L. J. 887 (1956).
13 WIs. STAT. §943.20(1)d (1959). This is not one of the better drafted provi-
sions. It appears to be a compromise with the Proposed Code provision which
simply referred to a "promise made with an intent not to perform it." The
revision emphasizes that simple breach of contract is not grounds for criminal
liability; Minutes of the Criminal Code Advisory Committee, 17 June 1955.
138 State ex rel Labuwi v. Hathaway, supra note 7; Frank v. State ex tel Meiers,
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ise to do something in the future.., is not sufficient to constitute a false
pretense."'.3 9 So stated the Supreme Court prior to the Criminal Code
by this limitation indicating their unwillingness to make what they con-
sidered a mere breach of contract the basis for criminal liability.1 40 To
accomplish their purpose courts relied upon shaky authority,' 41 and
accepted distinctions having only verbal clarity. 4 2
The phrase of 943.20(1)d ". . . a false and fraudulent scheme..
was suggested to the draftsmen by the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in Chilson v. People.143 This was a prosecution, for the crime of
obtaining money by means of a confidence game. The complainant was
induced to enter into a contract with Chilson to form a partnership to
sell real estate in Milwaukee. The complainant paid several hundred
dollars for certain lots on the strength of Chilson's representations.
Promises made by Chilson were never performed and there was ample
evidence to indicate that he had never intended to perform them. Chil-
son's plea that he had been convicted for mere failure to carry out a
plain civil contract was rejected by the Court, which stated:
If [defendant] had entered into the contract in good faith his
reasoning would be inclusive. Where a contract apparently legal
is entered into by one party with the intention of taking no step
to carry it out, but with the wrongful intention of causing the
other to part with his money without receiving adequate consider-
ation thereof, such contract may, and in this case did, become a
mere incident of the 'false and fraudulent scheme.' . . . The fact
that the affair was made to assume the guise of an ordinary busi-
ness transaction ... is without significance. It is the substance,
and not the form, that is material.-M (Emphasis supplied.)
The Wisconsin Code accords with several other recent efforts to reform
the criminal law by punishing those who acquire property of another
by a promise made with intent not to perform. 45
244 Wis. 658, 12 N.W. 2d 923 (1944) ; Corscot v. State, supra note 129; 2 Op.
Atty. Gen. 281 (1934). Although the doctrine is parroted in thousands of
cases, the poverty of its origin has been established, see Pearce, Theft by
False Promise, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 967, 978 (1953). It has been rejected in
Rhode Island, State v. McMahon, 49 R.I. 107, 140 At. 359 (1928), and in the
federal courts, see Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
139 State ex rel Labuwi v. Hathaway, supra note 7.
140 This seems to be the best explanation of the earlier decisions many of which
could as easily be decided on the lack of evidence of criminal intent i.e., Rex
v. Goodall, 168 Eng. Rep. 898 (1821, Crown Cases Reserved).
141 See State v. Green, supra note 131, which cited Commonwealth v. Drew, 19
Pick, 179 (Mass. 1837) which in turn relied upon a misinterpretation of Rex
v. Goodall, supra note 140, a case which ignored Rex v. Young, (Kings Bench,
189). See Hall, THaFr, LAW & SocIny (2nd ed. 1952) 49-52; Pearce, Theft
by False Promise, supra note 138.
142 Chaplin v. United States, 157 F. 2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
'43 224 Ill. 535, 79 N.E. 934 (1906) ; Platz, The Crintinal Code, 1956 Wis. L. Riv.
350, 375. The draftsmen were also cognizant of the thorough discussion by
Pearce, Theft by False Promise, supra note 138.
144 Chilson v. People, 224 Ill. at 535, 79 N.E. 934 (1906).
'45 N B. REV. STAT. c. 28, Sec. 28-1207; LA. CoDE Cim. LAw & PRoc. A N. Art.
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The construction of the federal mail fraud statute is of particular
interest because of its similarity to the Criminal Code. As originally
enacted the statute made criminal the use of the mails for ". . . any
scheme or artifice to defraud." 1 In Durland v. United States4 7 a con-
viction for mail fraud by representations in the form of promises was
sustained. The defendant used the mail to sell bonds which he promised
740-67; federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1341, codifying 35 STAT. 1130(1909), and the Durland decision, supra note 138. The Model Penal Code pro-
scribes "Theft by Deception."
"... . A promise which creates the impression that the promisor intends
that the promise shall be performed is deceptive if he does not have that
intention at the time of the promise; but the non-existence of that in-
tention shall not be inferred from the fact alone that the promise was not
performed." (206.2, Draft #4).
The comment to this section states:
"Of the various devices for swindling to which the criminal law has
accorded some measure of immunity in the past, that which has the
strongest support in precedent is the promise made without intention
to perform. It has long been recognized in tort law that a promise
ordinarily implies that the actor intends to perform, and that 'The state
of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.' Never-
theless a majority of the American states adhere to a rule of non-lia-
bility in false pretense prosecutions. The reason usually given, aside
from precedent, is that defaulting debtors would be subject to abusive
prosecutions designed to force them to pay. Associated with this is the
fear that conviction might be authorized upon no more evidence than
the fact that the contract was not performed i.e., the fact of breach
would be treated as sufficient evidence of an original intention not to
perform. This danger is expressly averted by [the Model Penal Code,
206.2 supra.
"Prosecution based on false promises has been authorized under the
federal mail fraud statute, for more than half a century, and is also
possible under the laws of Rhode Island, California, Nebraska, Louisi-
ana, Ohio, Massachusetts and New Jersey. Accordingly the drafting
staff undertook to learn whether the feared abuses had been encoun-
tered in these jurisdictions. Inquiries were addressed to prosecuting
attorneys, Better Business Bureaus, Post Office inspectors and the like.
Answers were uniformily negative; paradoxically, the only serious
complaint of abusive prosecutions against debtors for fraud came from
New York, which follows the majority rule. It may also be noted that
practically every jurisdiction has some special legislation punishing
fraudulent promises which victimize certain special interest groups. For
example, it is almost universally provided that to take lodgings without
intent to pay is criminal [cf. 943.21] ...
"A fear which has sometimes been expressed that businessmen may
be unjustly subjected to criminal liability where they make contracts,
intending, in the alternative to perform or to pay liquidated damages
or such damages as the law allows the promisee, is without founda-
tion. Not every promise implies an unequivocal intention to perform.
A provision for liquidated damages would obviously be relevant evi-
dence to show that the actor has not purposely created the false im-
pression that he would in all events perform. In that event, the promisor
could be held guilty only if he did not intend to do either. In short,
here as elsewhere, the actor is to be understood in the sense which he
expected and desired his hearer to understand him, and it is only where
he did not believe what he purposely caused his victim to believe that
he can be convicted of theft." (Comment 7 to 206.2, Tentative Draft
#2, Model Penal Code.)146 The statute has since been amended to define explicitly the result of the Dur-
land Case, see 18 U.S.C. 1341.
247 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
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to redeem at higher prices although actually he had no intention to so do.
The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that the statute
included representations made in the form of a promise:
[The statute] includes everything designed to defraud by repre-
sentations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises
as to the future. The significant fact is the intent and purpose
The charge is that, in putting forth this scheme, it was not
the intent of the defendant to make an honest effort for its
success, but that he resorted to this form and pretense of a bond
without a thought that he ... would ever make good its promise.
It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all such
intentional efforts to despoil... that this statute was passed .... 1 48
A number of cases bear testimony to the court's efforts to avoid
conflict with the limitation imposed by the "naked promise-present face'
distinction by finding misrepresentation of fact sometimes trivial Frank
v. State ex tel Meiers,4 9 is a leading example in Wisconsin. Here the
defendant asked the complainant for a loan stating, "I got a couple of
houses ... I can give you a first mortgage on." The houses in fact were
already mortgaged. At a preliminary examination the following ex-
change between the complainant and the defendant's lawyer took place:
Q. "You had relied entirely on the promise of this man to do
something four days later, is that right" [Italics added.]
A. "Sure."
The circuit court discharged the defendant on a writ of habeas corpus
following this preliminary examination, but the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin reversed on the ground that the defendant had implied that the
houses were at the time unencumbered. 1 0 On another occasion the
Court construed a statement in the future tense, "I will give you," in
the light of existing circumstances as actually meaning "I am giving
you." Thus the Court found a representation of the existing fact.11
The Criminal Code should make such dubious constructions unnecessary.
At common law the false representation had to be one of fact and
this requirement is recited in Corscot v. State.152 Cases in other juris-
dictions state as a consequence that a misrepresentation of law can not
be the basis for prosecution,'153 but the rationale of the law-fact distinc-
14s Id at 313. See also United States v. Rowe, 56 F. 2d 747 (2nd Cir. 1932).
149 Supra note 138.
150 244 Wis. at 660, 12 N.W. 2d at 924 (1944).
151 Corscot v. State, supra note 129 at 669. In State ex rel Labuwi v. Hatha-
way, supra note 7, the defendant advertised a Fourth of July celebra-
tion "for the benefit of the American Red Cross." It was not in fact such a
benefit and the defendant pocketed the proceeds. The Court held that false
pretenses would lie because there was implied the representations that the
celebration was for the benefit of the Red Cross, that he acted for the Red
Cross, and was in the business of raising funds for the Red Cross.
152 178 WAlis. at 671.
.53 State v. Jamison, 268 Mo. 185, 186 S.W. 972 (1916). State v. Edwards, 178
Minn. 446, 227 N.W. 495 (1929) where the defendant represented that certain
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tion here is again questionable. Where liability has been denied it had
been on the ground that everyone is presumed to know the law, and that
"ordinary vigilance" will disclose the truth or falsehood of representa-
tions as to matters of law.15 4 However, as negligence of the victim as
to other kinds of misrepresentations is not a defense, 15 5 it is hard to
see why it should be here. The Model Penal Code rejects the distinction
stating that "deception may relate to value, law, opinion, intention, or
other state of mind."'"5
Whether or not the kind of representations made by salesmen in
efforts to sell their wares be false representation is a much debated
issue. Exaggeration by sellers is commonplace and generally harmless
since buyers are usually aware that products are not all they are claimed
to be. Nevertheless circumstances may dictate criminal liability on the
basis of false statements of value by sellers. In Bates v. State,157 the
defendant represented that he had paid a certain price for land when
in fact he had paid less. This, said the Court, was not a matter of opin-
ion, although its effect was to convince the hearer of the value of the
property. 158
If a relation of trust and confidence exists and if there is an ex-
pectation of reliance upon statements calculated to induce the hearer to
make a bargain different from the one he thought he was making, a
court is likely to find liability despite the opinion-characteristics of the
statement. 159 In United States v. Rowe, °6 0 Judge Learned Hand stated:
• . the law still recognizes that in bargaining parties will puff
their wares in terms which neither side means seriously, and
which either so takes at his peril ... ; but it is no longer law that
declarations of value can never be a fraud. Like other words, they
get their color from their setting, and mean one thing when ex-
changed between traders, and another when uttered by a broker
to his customer. Values are facts as much as anything else; they
forecast the present opinions of possible buyers and sellers, and
concern existing, though inaccessible facts. Such latitude as the
law accords utterances about them, depends upon the hearer's
knowledge that the utterer expects him to use his own wits; and
while may once have been true that one might safely use them
stock was "non assessable." The majority held that this was a representation
of the law of Minnesota, and could not be the basis for the crime of false
pretenses. The Court suggested, however, that false pretenses might lie if the
representation concerned the law of a foreign jurisdiction, or a relation of
trust and confidence existed between the defendant and the victim.
154 State v. Edwards, supra note 153.
155 Palotta v. State, 184 Wis. 290, 199 N.W. 72 (1924) ; State ex rel Hull v. Lar-
son, supra note 131; Clark and Marshall pp. 830-831.156206.2(2) Tentative Draft #4.
157 124 Wis. 612, 103 N.W. 251 (1905).
158 Id. at 619.
159 Melli and Remington, Theft a Comparative Analysis, 1954 Wis. L. REv. 253,
264.
160 56 F. 2d 747 (2nd Cir. 1932).
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to stuff any gull one brought to hand, liability has expanded as
the law has become more tender toward credulity.1" '
4. The mental element in 943.20(1)d.
The defendant must intend to deprive the owner of title. It follows,
therefore, that an intention to return the property after temporary use,
will be a defense to a prosecution under this section.
The statute further requires that the defendant "intentionally" de-
ceive the victim,' 6 2 by a representation "known" to be false, with an
"intent to defraud." The latter requisite was demanded by the common
law and its application normally gives no difficulty. An intent to defraud
has not been found where the defendant by a trick induced the victim
to part with something to which the defendant had a legitimate claim.1 6 3
An intention to defraud need not be proved by direct and positive
evidence, it may be inferred from all the circumstances proved.0 4 In
State ex rel Hull v. Larson 65 the defendant, a truck owner charged
with obtaining money from Dane County, was shown to have inten-
tionally stated an excessive number of hours on the time sheets record-
ing the number of hours his truck was used by the county, and to have
accepted and retained the excessive amounts paid. From this the Court
stated an intention to defraud Dane County could be inferred. 6
G. Theft-Value
At common law the property involved in a wrongful appropriation
had to have some real value."' 7 The question of value should be sub-
mitted to the jury. 68 The Code provides:
(c) "Value" means the market value at the time of the theft or
the cost to the victim of replacing the property within a reason-
able time after the theft, whichever is less, but if the property
stolen is a document evidencing a chose in action or other in--
161Id. at 747. The Model Penal Code's treatment of "Puffing" is helpful.
"Exagerated commendation of wares in communications addressed to
the public or to a class or group shall not be deemed deceptive if:(a) it would be unlikely to mislead the ordinary persons of the class or
group addressed; and(b) there is no deception other than as the actor's belief in the com-
mendation; and(c) the actor was not in a position of special trust and confidence in re-
lation to the misled party."(206.2(3) Tentative Draft #4).
162 See WIs. STAT. §939.23(3) (1959).
163 In re Cameron, 44 Kan. 64, 66 (1890) ; People v. Thomas, 3 Hill 169 (N.Y.
(1842) ; Clark & Marshall, LAW OF CaimEs (6th ed. 1958) 823; Perkins, Cami-
NAL LAW, 864.
164 State v. Hintz, supra note 135; State ex rel Hull v. Larson, supra note 131.
gee also Knickerbocker Merchandising Co. v. United States, 13 F. 2d 544 (2nd
Cir. 1926).
165 State ex rel Hull v. Larson, supra note 131.
166 226 Wis. at 594; State v. Hintz, supra note 135.
36 7 Perkins, CRImINAL LAw, 194; Clark & Marshall, LAW OF CRlmEs, 716.




tangible right, value means either the market value of the chose
in action or other right or the intrinsic value of the document,
whichever is greater. If the thief gave consideration for, or had
a legal interest in, the stolen property, the amount of such con-
sideration or value of such interest shall be deducted from the
total value of the property.
1 69
The legality of the victim's possession has no bearing on the matter
of value. In Clementi v. State,170 the defendant stole certain gambling
devices. In holding that the nature of the property stolen does not
militate against a conviction, the Court stated:
We see no inconsistency in holding that contraband property may
be the subject of larceny, and in a holding that a court will not
lend its aid to a party to recover the value of contraband articles
in a civil action. Certainly one who has unlawfully procured pos-
session of an article belonging to another ought not to be per-
mitted to defend himself on the ground that that which he had
stolen has no value because its use is forbidden. If it had no
value, why did he steal it? It is a well-known fact that many
contraband articles have been sold and that a market of a sort
exists therefor.... The state is not seeking to recover the prop-
erty or its value. It is seeking to punish the defendants for vio-
lation of its criminal laws.' 7'
The contraband nature of the material is, of course, relevant because it
"affects its usability and therefore its salability.' 72 If the property is
salable the Court states its marketability may be established "in the
usual way."'' 73 Candor requires that one recognize the difficulty in es-
tablishing the market value of contraband goods, and the use of expert
witnesses, if available, might result in some unusual testimony.
The Code's definition of "value" does not treat specially the prob-
lem created by the person who misappropriates property believing it to
be of greater, or less, value than it is in fact, or the person who malici-
ously misappropriates property which has an insignificant market value
but is highly prized by the owner.'
CONTINUED IN NEXT ISSUE
,69 Wis. STAT. §943.20(2)c (1959). The Proposed Code simply stated that
"'value' means market value at the time of stealing, except that in the case of
property without market value, value means cost of replacement."
170 Supra note 24.
71 224 Wis. at 152.
172 Id. at 153.
173 Ibid.
17 The Model Penal Code, Section 205.15, Tentative Draft #4, states that:
"the amount involved [in theft] shall be the highest value of the stolen
property by any standard which is reasonably applicable. ... (Em-
phasis supplied.). Where the evidence of value is insufficient the theft
will be deemed a misdemeanor.
The comment to this section makes several valid points:
".... the amount involved has criminologic significance only if it cor-
responds with what the thief expected to get. A man who steals what
he believes to be a diamond necklace from the counter of Tiffany's is
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not a 'petty thief' psychologically when it turns out that they are rhine-
stones. He has consciously risked a determined pursuit by private and
public investigating agencies, the difficulties of disposing of the loot,
and the prospect of a long sentence if he is caught. The tramp who
lifts a shabby overcoat off a restaurant wall-hook evinces no such de-
fiant disregard of valuable property rights, even if it turns out that
$100 bills have been sewn in the lining.
"On the other hand there are administrative reasons for giving at
least prima facie effect to the amount actually stolen: (a) The prose-
cutor needs a readily ascertainable fact by which he can choose between
proceeding in a felony court or, for a petty misdemeanor, in a court of
limited jurisdiction. It would be distinctly inconvenient to learn at
trial for the felony that the defendant was prepared to prove his be-
lief that the object stolen was worth only $10, thus, perhaps, depriving
the court of jurisdiction... '
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